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[149] 
The Obergefell Marriage Equality 
Decision, with Its Emphasis on  
Human Dignity, and a  
Fundamental Right to Food Security 
 




Many believe the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 reflects a new era of tolerance and decency in our 
country, with love winning out over politics and discrimination.2  Our 
nation has progressed beyond the close-mindedness of the past, when 
same-sex couples were treated as second class citizens in our society, 
not entitled to the basic rights which all of us should enjoy.  After the 
Court announced its decision, President Obama said from the Rose 
                                                          
 * Maxine D. Goodman is Professor of Professional Responsibility and Legal 
Research and Writing at South Texas College of Law.  She would like to thank her 
terrific colleagues at the law school, as well as the outstanding editorial staff of the 
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their support with this Article.  She dedicates 
the Article to her daughters, Rachel and Audrey, who inspire her to think about 
human dignity as something everyone deserves in equal measure.   
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Byron Tau, Obama Calls Supreme Court Decision a Victory for America, WALL. ST. 
J. (June 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-calls-supreme-court-ruling-on-
gay-marriage-a-victory-for-america-1435335722??mod=capitaljournalrelatedbox; 
Marianne Williamson, Marriage Equality: It’s a Beautiful Thing When Democracy 
Prevails, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
marianne-williamson/marriage-equality-when-de_b_7678490.html; Andrew 
O’Hehir, America is Changing and Marriage Equality is a Huge Victory – But We Need to 
Go So Much Further, SALON (June 26, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/27/
america_is_changing_and_marriage_equality_is_a_huge_victory_but_we_need_to_go 
_so_much_further/. 
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Garden, “Today we can say, in no uncertain terms, that we have made 
our union a little more perfect.”3  As Justice Kennedy wrote in affirming 
petitioners’ fundamental right to marry in Obergefell: “[t]hey ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law.  The Constitution grants them this 
right.”4  Countless commentators applauded the Court’s opinion for its 
commitment to essential human rights, reliance on human dignity, and 
affirmation of society’s evolved sense of decency.5 
In Obergefell, the Court described petitioners’ constitutional 
argument as a “just claim to dignity.”6  The Supreme Court’s reliance 
on human dignity as the value underlying the due process and equal 
protection guarantees to which the petitioners were due in Obergefell, 
resembles the Court’s reliance on human dignity in other Supreme 
Court decisions.7  At other times, the Court has ruled to affirm the 
human dignity of the mistreated prison inmate, the defendant who 
wants to avoid giving self-incriminating testimony in court, the 
alleged criminal whose stomach the police forcibly pumped to obtain 
evidence, the defendant who wants to represent herself, and the 
government detractor who objected in obscene language to the draft.  
In each case, the Court relied on human dignity to remedy a 
constitutional infraction. 
Yet, with all the congratulations, pride, and gratefulness to the 
Supreme Court on the marriage equality decision,8 and the bountiful 
                                                          
 3. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same Sex Marriage a Right 
Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html. 
 4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 5. Sara El Yafi, Why the Supreme Court’s Decision to Legalize Gay Marriage Will 
Benefit You Wherever You Are on the Planet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-elyafi/why-the-supreme-courts-decision-to-legalize-
same-sex-marriage-will-benefit-you-wherever-you-are-on-the-planet_b_7749828.html 
(congratulating “all human beings” on the decision).  The “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” language comes from the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 8. This author wholeheartedly joins the “it’s about time” refrain and excitement 
over the Court’s decision. 
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commentary about the Court’s emphasis on human dignity,9 this 
author finds it difficult not to take stock of where we are in terms of 
advancing the most essential needs of Americans, as part of protecting 
their dignity.  The United States joined other developed nations in 
affirming marriage equality, recognizing, again, the fundamental 
right of all adults to marry.  Yet, in our prosperous nation, in 2014, the 
Children’s Defense Fund reported there are 14.7 million poor children 
and 6.5 million extremely poor children living in the United States.10  
Countless commentators have decried the state of the poor in this 
country, calling for renewed efforts to combat poverty.11  In a nation 
where the Court has acknowledged the right of all to marry, as a 
testament to their human dignity, the Court has never recognized the 
right of all to food security, and an end to poverty, as a testament to 
that same human dignity. 
Obviously, the two issues present a host of differences in terms of 
constitutional analysis.  The major difference is the positive versus 
negative rights distinction, which this Article addresses in Section III.A.  
Yet, the Court’s willingness to advance human dignity provides a 
meaningful common thread between the right to marry and the right to 
                                                          
 9. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity’, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doc
trine-of-dignity/391796/ (“Justice Kennedy invoked the word ‘dignity’ five times in 
the oral arguments; and other lawyers invoked it 16 times.  It was central to the 
opening statements of Solicitor General Don Verrilli.  ‘The opportunity to marry is 
integral to human dignity,’ he began.  ‘Excluding gay and lesbian couples from 
marriage demeans the dignity of these couples.’  It was also one of the first words 
uttered by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Mary L. Bonuato.”); Liz Halloran, Explaining Justice 
Kennedy: The Dignity Factor, NPR (June 28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/the 
two-way/2013/06/27/196280855/explaining-justice-kennedy-the-dignity-factor (“The 
[human dignity] concept appears no less than nine times in the landmark 26-page 
decision overturning the 1996 law blocking federal recognition of gay marriage.”). 
 10.  Marian Wright Edelman, Foreword to Ending Child Poverty Now, CHILDREN’S 
DEFENSE FUND 4 (2015), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/ending-child-
poverty-now-1.html.  
 11.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004); Evgeny Krasnov, 
Note: Freedom from Food: on the Need to Restore FDR’s Vision of Economic Rights in 
America, and How It Can Be Done, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 735 (2013); Dennis D. Hirsch, The 
Right to Economic Opportunity: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Welfare Rights 
Decisions, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 109, 134 (1996). 
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food security.  This Article links the Supreme Court’s reliance on human 
dignity as a constitutional value most recently in Obergefell to the Court’s 
ability to recognize a fundamental right to food security12 under a 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection analysis.  
Ideally, at some point soon, commentators will proclaim, “It’s about time” 
when the Court acknowledges food security as a fundamental right. 
At one time, such a constitutional analysis and outcome seemed 
likely.  In 1970, the Court ruled in Goldberg v. Kelly,13 that only after a 
fair hearing could social services terminate benefits of welfare 
recipients.  Justice Brennan wrote with regard to the nation’s 
provision of assistance to the needy that “from its founding the 
Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-
being of all persons within its borders.”14  The Court noted the 
inextricable link between human dignity and food security, 
describing welfare as the means of bringing “within the reach of the 
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community.”15  Around the same time, 
in the mid-60s, with the “War on Poverty,” President Lyndon Johnson 
promised a right to food security, linking it to human dignity, when 
he said, “We have a right to expect a job to provide food for our 
families, a roof over their head, clothes for their body….”16  He 
described the impact of poverty: “Poverty not only strikes at the needs 
                                                          
 12.   For purposes of this article, food security means “access by people at all 
times to enough food for an active, healthy life.”  Food & Nutrition Assistance, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/.aspx (last 
updated June 8, 2015).  Food insecurity thus means “access to adequate food is limited 
by a lack of money and other resources.”  Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Christian Gregory 
& Anita Singh, Household Food Security in the United States in 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
ECON. RES. REPORT NO.  ERR-173, 1 (Sept. 2014). 
 13.   397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 14.   Id. at 264–65. 
 15.   Scholars have supported the notion of a fundamental right to food security 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of our 
Constitution: Rethinking our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Stephen 
Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993). 
 16.  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Cumberland, Maryland City Hall 
(May 7, 1964) in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26223. 
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of the body.  It attacks the spirit and it undermines human dignity.”17 
However, since the mid-1970s, most Supreme Court opinions 
regarding welfare rights have favored the government, and the Court 
has routinely reversed lower court decisions favoring the poor.18  The 
welfare rights movement, once compared to the Civil Rights 
Movement,19 has lost steam.  It is as though the legal community has, 
largely, left those in poverty behind.  Unfortunately, the notion that 
human dignity means a right to food security on the part of every 
American, a bedrock principle of other nations’ constitutions and of 
international law,20 and, arguably, necessary to liberty and general 
welfare, has lost traction.21  As Louis Henkin states, “[o]ur welfare 
state does not supply what human dignity requires today.  There is 
no respect for human dignity in tolerating poverty and homelessness, 
de facto segregation, and the growth of an ‘underclass.’”22  
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Section I provides a brief 
background of human dignity as a value in international law as well 
as the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States and other 
nations.  This section also provides the various definitions that courts, 
nations, and legal documents have ascribed to the term.  Then, Section 
II briefly discusses food insecurity in the United States and legislative 
efforts to provide for the needy.  This Article uses “food insecurity” 
to mean “the lack of access to enough affordable, nutritious food to 
fully meet basic needs at all times due to lack of financial resources.”23  
                                                          
 17.   Johnson, supra note 16.  
 18.   See infra Section I.C. 
 19.   See Hirsch, supra note 11. 
 20.   The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care . . . .”  G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, Article 25(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).  See infra 
part III.E. 
 21.   See Hirsch, supra note 11 at 134. 
 22.   Louis Henkin, Dignity and Constitutional Rights, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 227 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. 
Parent eds., 1992). 
 23.   See Introduction: Hunger in the U.S., WHYHUNGER, http://www.why
hunger.org/frontend.php/overlay/simpleIndex?id=2056. See also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
supra note 12. 
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The section also summarizes the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
welfare cases24 from the 1960s until the present time. 
Section III provides five reasons the Supreme Court should 
acknowledge a fundamental right to food security for all American 
citizens.  Fundamental means, just as with other liberty rights under 
a Due Process Clause analysis, that unless it is necessary for the 
government to interfere with the right to achieve a compelling 
government objective, the government action is prohibited.  This 
Article does not describe the exact case that should be brought to get 
this question before the Supreme Court; rather, it encourages the legal 
community to reinvigorate the legal fight for this fundamental right, 
at a time when doing so just might succeed. 
The five reasons the Court should establish this fundamental 
right are grounded in existing constitutional jurisprudence involving 
human dignity, viewed largely through the lens of Obergefell.  Though 
many have written on human dignity in constitutional 
jurisprudence,25 scholars have written little on the necessary 
connection between human dignity and food security and why the 
Supreme Court should acknowledge this link.  As we applaud 
Obergefell as a reflection of the Court’s commitment to human dignity, 
commentators should pause to consider a jurisprudence which 
affirms the right of all citizens to marry on Fourteenth Amendment 
due process and equal protection grounds but which fails to recognize 
a right to food security for all citizens.  This Article strives to show 
why our evolved sense of decency and our existing Supreme Court 




                                                          
 24   “Welfare cases” mean lawsuits involving federal and state welfare 
programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Food Stamps, and other 
safety net programs. 
 25.   See Jordan Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right:  Jurisprudentially 
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145 (1984); Leslie Meltzer Henry, 
The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011); Erin Daly, Human Dignity in 
the Roberts Court: a Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the 
Reluctant Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2011). 
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I. Background of Human Dignity as a Value in  
 International and Constitutional Law 
 
This section briefly describes the philosophical and religious 
underpinnings of human dignity as a legal concept, as well as its 
meaning and use under international law, in United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and as a value or right in other nations’ 
constitutions. 
 
A. Philosophical and Religious Underpinnings of Human 
Dignity 
 
The American concept of human dignity underlying human 
rights and constitutional guarantees is believed to have originated 
from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant,26 who posited, “to 
treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals 
able to choose their destiny.”27  He defined dignity as “a quality of 
intrinsic, absolute value, above any price, and thus excluding any 
equivalence.”28  Kant’s “formula of ends” meant that people should 
behave in such a way “that you treat humanity, both in your person 
and in the person of each other individual, always at the same time as 
an end, never as a mere means.”29  Accordingly, human dignity, as 
opposed to something with a price, cannot be replaced by anything 
else, and it is not relative to anyone’s desires.30  As one scholar 
                                                          
 26.   “Thomas Paine eloquently invoked the natural dignity of man as the reason 
to protect individual rights that transcend authoritative rule. Paine’s conception of 
dignity marked a distinct break from the British rule where dignity had more of an 
ancient Roman connotation and was reserved for the nobility or aristocracy.  Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton shared Paine’s views.”  See Rex D. Glensy, The 
Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 77 (2011). 
 27.   See Izhak Englard, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: Human Dignity: 
From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 
1918–20 (2000). 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death 
Penalty, Henkin, supra note 22, at 153–56. 
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describes Kant’s theory, “the humanity in each of us is of infinite 
value, and this explains why we must respect the humanity of others 
as we respect the humanity in ourselves.”31 
Commentators also ascribe a religious source to human dignity 
as relied on in Supreme Court jurisprudence, stemming from the 
Judeo-Christian notion that all people are created in the image of God.  
The Book of Genesis provides that God created man in God’s own 
image.32  As such, “‘there is a divine ‘spark,’ as it were, in human 
beings.  This element establishes man’s humanity and grants him 
unique status among the creatures in God’s creation, or in other 
words, his dignity.”33  Professor George Fletcher equates this Biblical 
source with Kant’s theory that each life has a dignity beyond price: 
“Kant’s idea of universal humanity functions as the secular analogue 
to creation in the image of God.”34 
Religions throughout the world are important sources for the 
conception of human dignity.  In Catholicism, for example, “human 
life is sacred and [Catholicism professes] that the dignity of the human 
person is the foundation of a moral vision for society”; Pope Benedict 
XVI stated that “the dignity of man is the locus of human rights”; the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that man was created in 
God’s image.35  Many scholars attribute the commitment to human 
dignity shown by Justices Kennedy and Brennan to their religious 
upbringings and beliefs.36  Some commentators contend the nation’s 
                                                          
 31.   George Fletcher, Essay, In God’s Image: the Religious Imperative of Equality 
under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1619 (1999). 
 32.   Genesis 1:26.  See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional 
Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 206 (2008) (“The notion of Imago Dei in Genesis was a 
universal attribute shared by all human beings.”). 
 33.   Rao, supra note 32, at 206. 
 34.   Fletcher, supra note 31, at 1619. 
 35.   Life and Dignity of The Human Person, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://
www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/life-
and-dignity-of-the-human-person.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 36.   See Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and the 
Pursuit of Equality and Liberty, 61 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 665, 678 (2013) (“Brennan 
believed Catholic social teaching had adopted the concept of human dignity, which 
derived from the belief that man was created in the image of God.  Justice Brennan 
echoed this thought in a speech to the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1964, stating 
6 GOODMAN MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:53 AM 
Winter 2016] THE OBERGEFELL MARRIAGE EQUALITY DECISION 157 
founding principles all originate in Judeo-Christian principles, which 
emphasize the man in God’s image to human dignity connection. 
Our nation’s history provides overwhelming evidence that 
America was birthed upon Judeo-Christian principles.  The first act of 
America’s first Congress in 1774 was to ask a minister to open with 
prayer and to lead Congress in the reading of four chapters of the 
Bible.  In 1776, in approving the Declaration of Independence, our 
founders acknowledged that all men “are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights …” and noted that they were relying 
“on the protection of Divine Providence” in the founding of this 
country.  John Quincy Adams said, “The Declaration of Independence 
laid the cornerstone of human government upon the first precepts of 
Christianity.”37  
Regardless of source, whether religious or philosophical, or the 
two combined, human dignity means every individual has intrinsic 
and equal worth.38  Human dignity is another manner of referring to 
a person’s worth, which differs from a person’s merit: “human beings 
do not vary in their dignity or worth.  Their dignity or worth is a kind 
of value that all human beings have equally and essentially.”39  Arthur 
Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
from 1994 until his retirement as Chief Justice in 2005,40 said, “respect 
for dignity implies respect for the autonomy of each person, and the 
                                                          
‘the Old and New Testament teach that all men have rights – that every individual 
has Rights because as a child of God he is endowed with human dignity.’”). 
 37.   J. Randy Forbes, Obama Is Wrong When He Says We're Not a Judeo-Christian 
Nation, U.S. NEWS (May 7, 2009, 3:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2009/05/07/obama-is-wrong-when-he-says-were-not-a-judeo-christian-nation. 
 38.   Bedau, supra note 30, at 153–56. 
 39.   Id. at 153. 
 40.   Mandela made him the first president of the new Constitutional Court in 
1994; Chaskalson had served on Mandela’s defense team for treason in 1963 and was 
an ardent opponent of Apartheid.  He wrote the opinion abolishing the death penalty.  
See Rebecca Davis, Death of a Lion of the Law, DAILEY MAVERICK, (Dec. 12, 2012, 2:44 
AM), http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-03-death-of-a-lion-of-the-law-
arthur-chaskalson/#.VaA_KVzBwXA (“The day after the Constitutional Court was 
formally opened on 14 February 1995, the 11 green-robed judges heard their first case.  
Their first ruling was on the unconstitutionality of the death penalty, and they would 
go on to rule on a host of other vital issues, including the recognition of same-sex 
marriages and the right of all South Africans to a roof over their head.”). 
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right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being or treated in a 
degrading or humiliating manner.”41  Commentators posit an 
emphasis on human dignity in international law arose from rejecting 
totalitarianism’s lack of respect and dehumanizing treatment of 
citizens.42 
 
B. Human Dignity in International Law 
 
Human dignity became connected to human rights as the 
premier value of the New World Order in response to the atrocities of 
fascism and Nazism of World War II.43  Governments and human 
rights groups sought to protect human dignity against the abuses of 
totalitarian regimes.44  As such, international legal texts, such as the 
United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
affirm the dignity of all men and women, with the Declaration’s 
Preamble recognizing the “inherent dignity and . . . the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”45  Article One 
of the Declaration states: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”46  The 
United Nations Charter affirmed faith in human rights and dignity 
and thus required a pledge to promote respect for, and observance of, 
                                                          
 41.   Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 135 (David Kretzmer and Eckart 
Klein eds., 2002). 
 42.   See Maxine D. Goodman, In the Holocaust's Shadow: Can German and American 
Constitutional Jurisprudence Provide a “New Guarantee” of Human Dignity?, 4 BRIT. J. AM. 
LEGAL STUD. 303 (2015). 
 43.   Id. at 133. 
 44.   Julie Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role 
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1939 (2003) (“Our review 
of the deployment of the term dignity of persons . . . documents.”). 
 45.   G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; MARY 
ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, appendix 7 (2001). 
 46.   Id. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms.47 
Other international legal instruments and treaties treat human 
dignity as a preeminent value underlying human rights, with 
commentators frequently describing the connection between human 
dignity and human rights.48  Human dignity “furnishes each one of 
us, whether strong or weak, politically powerful or disenfranchised, 
competent or inept, and whatever our race, religion, sex, or sexual 
orientation, with an indefeasible moral standing to protest (or to have 
protested on our behalf) all insidious attempts to degrade our 
persons.”49 
In addition to the international community rallying around 
human dignity as protecting against the abuses of a totalitarian 
regime, individual nations included the value in their constitutions.  
Article I of Germany’s Basic Law, adopted by the West German states 
in 1949, proclaims “the dignity of man is inviolable.  To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority.”50  Under German 
constitutional law, human dignity is not subject to balancing against 
other rights, such as freedom of expression.51  Rather, human dignity 
prevails as the value underlying fundamental rights and supporting 
the individual’s “free unfolding of personality.”52  After World War 
II, Japan, West Germany, and Italy were among the first to include 
human dignity in their constitutional documents.53 
Nations including France, Canada, Israel, and South Africa now 
rely heavily on human dignity as a lodestar constitutional value.54  
                                                          
 47.   Glendon, supra note 45, at 78. 
 48.   See id. 
 49.   Henkin, supra note 22, at 48.  
 50.   Ernest Benda, Fifty Years of German Basic Law, The New Departure for Germany: 
the Protection of Human Dignity (Article I of the Basic Law), 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 443, 443 
(2000) (citing Article 1, 1 of the German Constitution). 
 51.   Id. 
 52.   James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
 53.   Doron Shulztiner & Guy E. Carmi, Human Dignity in National Constitutions: 
Functions, Promises, and Dangers, 62 AM.  J. COMP. L. 461, 465 (2014). 
 54.   See Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 
(2012) (describing how other nations’ included human dignity as a constitutional 
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Guy E. Carmi and Doron Shulztiner describe nations’ use of the term 
in their constitutions, including a comprehensive description of what 
the term is meant to protect.55  In South Africa, the right to human 
dignity is embedded as a discrete right in the Bill of Rights, with the 
Constitutional Court affording the right special weight.56  As these 
commentators describe, nations differ both in terms of their reliance 
on human dignity as a fundamental value in constitutional 
jurisprudence, as well as on the value’s meaning.57  As shown below, 
the United States has developed its own constitutional jurisprudence 
of human dignity, despite the absence of an explicit guarantee in the 
United States Constitution. 
 
C. Human Dignity as a Value in United States Constitutional 
Jurisprudence 
 
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly use 
the term human dignity,58 the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on 
the value, most often linked to the Bill of Rights.  In Miranda v. Arizona, 
the Court held that “the constitutional foundation underlying the 
privilege [Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination] is the 
respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens.”59  And, when describing the role of human dignity in death 
                                                          
value following the international human rights instruments and German 
constitution). 
 55.   See Shulztiner & Carmi, supra note 53. 
 56.   Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity as a Constitutional Value: A South African 
Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2011).  According to Chaskalson, the 
Constitutional Court stresses human dignity because of South Africa’s history of 
Apartheid.  He quotes this language from a court decision: “Respect for the dignity 
of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa.  For apartheid was a 
denial of a common humanity.  Black people were refused respect and dignity and 
thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished.  The new Constitution 
rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South Africans.”  
 57.   Shulztiner & Carmi, supra note 53. 
 58.   Some state constitutions, including Illinois, Louisiana, and Montana, 
actually enumerate dignity as protected under their constitutions.  MONT.  CONST. art 
II, § 4; LA.  CONST. art.  I § 3; ILL.  CONST. art 1, § 20; see Burt Neuborne, Forward: State 
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893–95 (1989). 
 59.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1996).   
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penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has 
said that “even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed 
of common human dignity”60  The Court has repeatedly proclaimed, 
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.”61 
After World War II and the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, “the Court embraced dignity as something 
possessed by individuals,” rather than just states and other entities, 
relying on the concept in its constitutional interpretation.62  
Commentators opine it was in response to the war and adoption of 
international legal norms in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that the Court “changed the content of U.S. constitutional law 
to name dignity as a distinct and core value.”63 
In 1944, Justice Frank Murphy64 used the term “dignity” in his 
                                                          
 60.   Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (per curiam). 
 61.   Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2001) 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles). 
 62.   Resnick & Suk, supra note 45, at 1926, 1939 (“As a result of WWII when legal 
and political commentary around the world turned to the term dignity to identify 
rights of personhood . . .  Dignity talk in the law of the United States is an example of 
how U.S. law is influenced by the norms of other nations, by transnational 
experiences, and by international legal documents.”  “Our review of the deployment 
of the term dignity of persons in the constitutional law of the United States 
demonstrates that use of the word began during World War II and expanded as the 
term was embraced in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other 
nations’ constitutive legal documents.”). 
 63.   Id. at 1941. 
 64.   Justice Murphy was vehemently opposed to discrimination of any type, and 
his opinions while on the Court were certainly informed by the events in Europe 
during his tenure on the bench.  Commentators link Justice Murphy’s Catholic faith 
and concerns for labor to his strong interest in and reliance on human dignity.  See 
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 
19 EUR. J. INT’L.  L. 655 (2008); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Essay: Justice Frank Murphy and 
American Labor Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1900, 1924 (June 2002) (“He brought to the law 
and the art of judging some eminently worthy values.  Among them was an unceasing 
determination to see realized in the daily lives of ordinary people such basic human 
rights as freedom of expression, fair and equal treatment, personal dignity, and the 
capacity to form organizations to promote their political, economic, and social well-
being.”).  Yet, arguably, the horrors ofWorld War II, in response to which he formed 
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dissent in Korematsu v. United States.65  Fred Korematsu was convicted 
of remaining in a designated military area in violation of the military 
requirement that persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded from that 
area.66  The Court upheld the exclusion program based on military 
necessity.  Justice Black, writing for the majority, said the Court 
“could not reject the finding of the military authorities” that the 
exclusion was necessary.67 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy opposed the race-based 
classification based on human dignity concerns: 
To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this 
case, however well-intentioned may have been the 
military command on the Pacific Coast, is to adopt one of 
the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to 
destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage 
and open the door to discriminatory actions against other 
minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.68 
Justice Murphy described the military orders as falling “into the 
ugly abyss of racism” and as going beyond the brink of constitutional 
power.69  Justice Murphy again called forth the notion of dignity, this 
time “human dignity,” in his dissent in Yamashita v. Styer.70  Tomoyuki 
                                                          
the group described herein, also contributed to his inclusion of this value in his 
jurisprudential decision-making. 
 65.   323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944).  Justice Murphy also dissented in Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 135 (1945) (considering the constitutionality of police officers’ 
convictions under Section 20 of the Federal Criminal Code) (Justice Murphy stated 
that by beating an African-American man to death, police had deprived him of the 
“respect and fair treatment that befits the dignity of man, a dignity recognized and 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
 66.   Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.  Korematsu's residence was in San Leandro, 
California, one of the areas from where all persons of Japanese ancestry were 
excluded. 
 67.   Id. at 219. 
 68.   Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 69.   Justice Murphy was the first to use the term “racism” in a Supreme Court 
opinion.  Frank Murphy Hall of Justice, DETROIT: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE 
MOTOR CITY (Dec. 2012), http://detroit1701.org/Frank%20Murphy%20Hall%20of%
20Justice.html. 
 70.  327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946). 
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Yamashita, a general of the Japanese army who was convicted by a 
military commission of violating laws of war, sought a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the jurisdiction and legal authority of the military 
commission that convicted him.  The Court denied the petition for 
certiorari. 
In his dissent, Justice Murphy wrote: 
[I]f we are ever to develop an orderly international 
community based upon a recognition of human dignity, it 
is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment 
of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the 
ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.”71 
Justice Murphy ended his lengthy dissent with another reference to 
dignity: “While peoples in other lands may not share our beliefs as to 
due process and the dignity of the individual, we are not free to give 
effect to our emotions in reckless disregard of the rights of others.”72 
After this, human dignity continued to play a role in American 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Several Supreme Court justices have 
referred to the concept at one time or another, while Justices Murphy, 
                                                          
 71.   Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 72.   Id. at 41. 
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Frankfurter,73 Brennan,74 and Kennedy75 have given the value the most 
“air time,”76 relying on it to underlie protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment, privacy rights, and other explicit constitutional 
guarantees.  The more conservative justices have also discussed the 
value and its role in the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.77 
Commentators contend that, generally speaking, in American 
constitutional jurisprudence, human dignity is most closely tied to 
liberty; human dignity and liberty allow for individuals to live 
autonomously, without state interference.78  As this Article will 
address later, many argue that the notion of human dignity as 
liberty is inconsistent with the Court acknowledging a 
fundamental right to food security, as this necessitates government 
interference.  Others proclaim the opposite—that liberty cannot 
                                                          
 73.   In McNabb v. United States, Justice Felix Frankfurter used the term dignity in 
1943 as part of the rationale for requiring that those who are arrested are taken before 
the committing authority without delay.  318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (“The purpose of 
this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal procedure is plain.  A democratic 
society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process.”).  He also used the term in his concurring 
opinion in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 89 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
involving a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights: “Whether their [the Bill of Rights] 
safeguards of liberty and dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends 
upon the particular circumstances.”). 
 74.   Justice Brennan, after serving in World War II as an Army JAG, served as a 
judge in New Jersey courts before joining the Supreme Court in 1956.  He was 
Catholic, as was Justice Frank Murphy, who relied heavily on human dignity in his 
decision-making.  See Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and 
the Pursuit of Equality and Liberty, 61 CLEV.  ST. L. REV. 665 (2013).  According to Leslie 
Melzer Henry, Brennan “invoked ‘dignity’ in an astounding thirty-nine opinions 
during his tenure on the Court.”  Henry supra note 25, at 171.  See RAOUL BERGER, 
Justice Brennan, ‘Human Dignity,’ and Constitutional Interpretation; Henkin, supra note 
22 at 10.; Stephen J. Wermiel, Essay: Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice 
Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.  J. 223 (1998). 
 75.   One commentator referred to Justice Kennedy as “the dignity whisperer.”  
Dahlia Lithwick, An Argument for Dignity, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2015/0
4/gay_marriage_arguments_at_supreme_court_anthony_kennedy_on_dignity.html. 
 76.   See Henry, supra note 25 (comparing frequency of use of the concept). 
 77.   See infra Part III.D. 
 78.   Whitman, supra note 52, at 1161. 
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exist for those who lack food security.79 
 
II. Food Insecurity in America, Government Assistance, 
 and the Court’s Decisions Regarding Welfare 
 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, in 
2013, 14.3 percent of American households (17.5 million households) 
were food insecure.80  These households “had difficulty at some time 
during the year providing enough food for all their members due to a 
lack of resources.”81  Fourteen percent of households in the United 
States were food insecure despite welfare and food stamp programs, 
meant to provide assistance to Americans in need.82  Approximately 
nine percent of these households had children.83  In 2013, “49.1 million 
Americans lived in food insecure households, including 33.3 million 
adults and 15.8 million children.”84  Present rates of poverty in the 
United States are higher than in several other industrialized nations.85 
In terms of reasons for food insecurity, according to the 
organization, WhyHunger, federal food programs face increasing 
resource cuts.  The organization notes that some who are eligible for 
food assistance do not receive it, and, at times, the assistance provided 
is not sufficient to remedy food insecurity.86  The organization also 
notes that circumstances like immigration status and income level can 
                                                          
 79.   For instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “We have come to a clearer 
realization of the fact . . . that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence.”  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union 
Message to Congress (January 11, 1944) in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http:/
/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518. 
 80.   Hunger and Poverty Fact Sheet, FEEDING AMERICA, http://www
.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/impact-of-hunger/hunger-and-poverty/
hunger-and-poverty-fact-sheet.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 81.   Food & Nutrition Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/
topics/food-nutrition-assistance/.aspx  (last updated June 8, 2015). 
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Hunger and Poverty Fact Sheet, supra note 80. 
 84.   Id. 
 85.   See Helen Hershkoff, Forward: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State 
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 801 (2002). 
 86.   WHYHUNGER, supra note 23. 
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affect an individual’s right to assistance.87 
In 2013, food insecurity varied dramatically from state to state, 
with the percentage of food insecurity ranging from 8.7 percent in 
North Dakota to 21.2 percent in Arkansas.88  Cities also see a great 
disparity in food insecurity, with Memphis, San Antonio, 
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco currently among the poorest 
American cities; in Memphis, twenty-six percent of its residents had 
been food insecure sometime during 2014.89  Regardless of location, 
across the board, the nation’s children suffer the most from food 
insecurity.  During the 2012 to 2013 school year, fifty-one percent of 
pre-Kindergarten through twelfth grade students were eligible to 
receive free and reduced-price lunches, illustrating the striking level 
of poverty among this population.90 
The history of welfare in the United States reflects, at best, the 
lack of a national commitment to the plight of the poor and, at worst, 
a steady decline during the past fifty years in our commitment to 
caring for the needy.  Welfare programs to provide cash assistance to 
the poor in the United States came about after the Great Depression, 
when the government undertook to better assist families with the 
necessities of food and shelter.  In advancing his New Deal agenda, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) said, “If, as our 
Constitution tells us, our Federal Government was established among 
other things, to ‘promote general welfare,’ it is our plain duty to 
provide for that security upon which welfare depends.”91  Congress 
enacted the Social Security Act in 1935 to provide unemployment and 
                                                          
 87.   WHYHUNGER, supra note 23. 
 88.   Alex Henderson, 10 Cities Where an Appalling number of Americans are 
Starving, SALON (Jan. 10, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/01/10/10_cities_
where_an_appalling_number_of_americans. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Lyndsey Layton, Majority of U.S. Public School Students are in Poverty, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 16, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/majority-of-
us-public-school-students-are-in-poverty/2015/01/15/df7171d0-9ce9-11e4-a7ee-
526210d665b4_story.html. 
 91.   President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Objectives 
and Accomplishments of the Administration, (June 8, 1934) in U.C. SANTA BARBARA 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
14690. 
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old-age insurance, maternal and general health programs, and 
general economic assistance for the needy.92  The main purpose of 
these categorical assistance programs was to encourage state 
governments to provide “new and greatly enhanced welfare 
programs.”93  Title IV-A of the Social Security Act established Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), a joint federal-state 
program.  It was created to provide economic support for needy, 
dependent children and those who care for them.94 
During the period from adoption of AFDC through the 1960s, the 
number of families receiving support increased dramatically, from 
162,000 to 1,875,000.95  Critics challenged existing programs for not 
providing job training and opportunities.  Accordingly, in May 1964, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a “War on Poverty,” with the 
Economic Opportunity Act to provide job training and education.  
Johnson said, “We have a right to expect a job to provide food for our 
families, a roof over their head, clothes for their body and with your 
help and with God’s help, we will have it in America!”96 
 Around the same time, Congress passed the first law creating a 
permanent food stamp program,97 which allows eligible low-income 
                                                          
 92.   SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 51. 
 93.   Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 644 (1969) (Warren, J., dissenting).   
 94.   AFDC reimburses each participating state with a percentage of the funds it 
expends. 
 95.   Eugene M. Lewit, Donna L. Terman & Richard E. Behrman, Children and 
Poverty: Analysis & Recommendations, 7 J. CHILD. & POVERTY (1997), http://www.
princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=53
&articleid=284&sectionid=1869. 
 96.   President Lyndon Baines Johnson, Remarks at Cumberland, Maryland City 
Hall (May 7, 1964), in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26223; see also WAR ON POVERTY (PBS 1998), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bonus-video/presidents-
economy-lbj/. 
 97.   A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“On Jan. 
31, 1964, President Johnson requested Congress to pass legislation making the FSP 
permanent.  Secretary Orville Freeman submitted proposed legislation to establish a 
permanent FSP on April 17, 1964.”). 
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individuals to purchase food.98  The food stamp program, despite 
sustaining significant funding cuts and then rebounding from those 
cuts with changing political climates, serves as one of the most 
enduring and effective parts of the “social safety net.”99  It has at times 
served as the “gap filler” where other programs have failed; of those 
who receive food stamps, eighty percent receive other types of 
benefits as well.100  Today, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (“SNAP”) continues to provide monthly benefits for eligible 
families. 
Yet, during the 1970s, with growing inflation, the rate of benefits 
decreased significantly and, according to Cass Sunstein, “Nixon’s 
appointees stopped an unmistakable trend in the direction of 
recognizing social and economic rights.”101  In the 1980s the welfare 
program came under increased, bipartisan criticism for its inability to 
properly and effectively assist those in need.102  The Reagan 
Administration expressed disdain for welfare programs not linked to 
jobs.  In describing his desired welfare reforms, which would 
emphasize work and jobs, Reagan quoted President Roosevelt from 
his State of the Union address on January 4, 1935, warning that 
welfare was “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit” and 
                                                          
 98.   A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“On Jan. 
31, 1964, President Johnson requested Congress to pass legislation making the FSP 
permanent.  Secretary Orville Freeman submitted proposed legislation to establish a 
permanent FSP on April 17, 1964.”).  The program’s mission is “providing relevant, 
vital help to boost nutrition, economic security and health among seniors, children, 
people with disabilities, and unemployed or low-income working families.” 
 99.   R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 183 
(1994). 
 100.  Id. at 185. 
 101.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 169 (describing Nixon as “the anti-Roosevelt” in 
terms of social and economic rights).  Sunstein also describes how Nixon’s Supreme 
Court appointee, Warren Burger, and Burger’s Court, “nipped these developments 
[social and economic rights] in the bud, and by 1975 the whole idea of minimum 
welfare guarantees had become implausible.” 
 102. Id. 
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that “we must now escape the spider’s web of dependency.”103   
In the first two years of Reagan’s presidency, the food stamp 
program sustained $6 billion in budget cuts.104  Reagan believed in a 
welfare system that imposed norms of work and certain family 
values, whereby a man living in a household should provide for the 
family as husband and father, rather than allowing government 
support for those in other types of family and household 
relationships.105 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(“PRWORA”), abolishing the AFDC and presumably “reforming” the 
welfare state.106  Clinton stated he wanted to “end welfare as we know 
it.”107  At the time, most of those relying on the welfare cash benefits 
were women with children, and the idea was that because of the 
healthy economy, those women could find jobs.108  The statute 
replaced existing programs with a cash welfare block grant called the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) program.109  
Some of the goals were to end welfare as an entitlement program,110 
require recipients to work, place a lifetime limit of five years on cash 
benefits, discourage out-of-wedlock births, and enhance enforcement 
of child support.111 
The program gave states fixed amounts (limited to five years) in 
                                                          
 103.  Robert Pear, Reagan Seeks Welfare Plan to Free Poor From Government 
Dependency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/05/us/reagan-
seeks-welfare-plan-to-free-poor-from-government-dependency.html. 
 104.  Melnick, supra note 99, at 230. 
 105.  Id. at 129. 
 106.  Cf. Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1997, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/0sunst3/the-worst-thing-bill-
clinton-has-done/376797/. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Ed Koch, It’s Time to Reexamine The Welfare Reform Law of 1996, HUFFINGTON 
POST, (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-koch/Welfare-reform_b_
1428284.html.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See Jennifer E.K. Kendrex, Punishing the Poor Through Welfare Reform: Cruel 
and Unusual? 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2015). 
 111.  Id. 
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the form of block grants designed to establish programs of temporary 
assistance.112  The act does not require states to provide any specific 
assistance to the poor.113  Instead, it added time limits and work rules 
and capped federal spending.  Critics claimed that the reforms 
allowed states to stop providing cash assistance to the poor, most of 
whom could not find jobs because they were competing with skilled 
and semi-skilled middle-class workers, thus exacerbating the nation’s 
poverty challenges.114  Those who supported the new program 
praised the decreased dependency by the needy.115 
Many contend that the end of AFDC, along with the 2007 to 2009 
Great Recession, worsened the plight of America’s poor.116  Present 
rates of poverty in the United States are higher than in several other 
industrialized nations.117  Several recent studies find that as many as 
one in every four low-income single mothers is unemployed and 
lacking cash aid—approximately four million women and children.118 
The Supreme Court’s role with regard to Congress and these 
programs in terms of advancing human dignity concerns related to 
food security, though inconsistent, has generally favored the 
government, against the interests of the poor and food insecure.  
Initially, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court 
appeared willing to acknowledge a fundamental right to food 
security.  In Goldberg v. Kelly,119 King v. Smith,120 and Shapiro v. 
                                                          
 112.  Edelman, supra note 106. 
 113.  Again, as described above, the poor can still turn to food stamps and 
Medicaid for some relief. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/welfare-limits-left-poor-adrift
-as-recession-hit.html?_r=1. 
 116.  See Hershkoff, supra note 87, at 801 (“Since 1996, . . . about two and a half 
million former welfare recipients have entered the labor market, earning, on average, 
only seven dollars an hour for a thirty hour work week—yielding an income below 
that of the poverty level for a household of two or more individuals.”). 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  DeParle, supra note 115. 
 119.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 120.  392 U.S. 309 (1968) (deciding Alabama's “substitute father” regulation, 
which denied AFDC benefits to the children of a mother who "cohabits" in or outside 
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Thompson,121 the Court ruled in favor of welfare recipients in cases 
challenging provisions that would lessen or stop their benefits.  For 
instance, in Goldberg, petitioners challenged the procedures New York 
used to terminate mothers’ welfare benefits.122  Under that state’s law, 
welfare benefits could be denied based on a caseworker’s mere doubts 
as to a recipient’s eligibility.123  A recipient could seek review of the 
caseworker’s justifications by way of a hearing, but only after the state 
had terminated the benefits.124  The Court held that because welfare 
benefits were like property, the government had to provide due 
process before taking them away.125 
Despite these early cases, the early 1970s showed a weakening of 
Supreme Court support for rights of welfare recipients, a change 
scholars attribute to “the rising hegemony of the ‘moral majority,’ 
which argued that entitlement to basic rights should be predicated on 
behavioral prescriptions unrelated to actual need.”126  In Dandridge v. 
Williams, the Court rejected the notion that the “maximum grant” 
provision of Maryland’s AFDC, by which families, no matter the 
number of children, could receive only a certain amount of benefits, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.127  The Court applied a rational 
basis test to the constitutional analysis rather than treating the 
classification (families with greater numbers of children) as a 
                                                          
her home with any single or married able-bodied man, was inconsistent with the 
Social Security Act; the Court did not decide the constitutionality of the regulation.). 
 121.  394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down durational residency requirements as 
part of welfare benefits.  Specifically, the Court addressed the 1992 part of the 
California statute regarding Aide to Families with Dependent Children limiting 
maximum welfare benefits during a resident’s first year of residency in California to 
the amount the resident was receiving in his prior residence.  For the California 
residents who sued, the statute resulted in substantially lower welfare benefits than 
they would have received, absent the statutory provision.  The Court held the statute 
unconstitutional because it infringed on the resident’s “right to travel,” a right “firmly 
embedded in our jurisprudence.”). 
 122.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 257. 
 123.  Id. at 258. 
 124.  Id. at 256. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Bridgette Baldwin, In Supreme Judgment of the Poor: The Role of the United 
States Supreme Court in Welfare Law and Policy, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2008). 
 127.  397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). 
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protected or suspect class requiring strict scrutiny standard of review 
and a compelling state interest; thus, the Court rejected the argument 
that the cap violated a fundamental right to welfare.128  In their 
dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall chided the majority for using 
the same constitutional test used for business regulations for “the 
literally vital interests of a powerless minority—poor families without 
breadwinners . . . .”129 
A decade later, the Court again failed to affirm the poor’s human 
dignity in Harris v. McRae.130  In Harris, a class of pregnant women 
sued, claiming the Hyde Amendment of the Medicaid program 
violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause by 
denying them funding for medically necessary abortions.131  At issue 
was whether the Medicaid program, which subsidizes a woman’s 
medically necessary services, could fail to subsidize a medically 
necessary abortion.132  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claim, holding that due process does not confer entitlement to federal 
funds for the protected right to have an abortion.133  The Court held as 
follows: 
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies 
at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty 
recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a 
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional 
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the 
full range of protected choices.134 
While human dignity prevailed in allowing women the freedom to 
                                                          
 128.  Williams, 397 U.S. at 487 (“By the early 1970s, however, the Court had 
rejected the view that the federal Constitution guarantees any right to minimal 
subsistence, declaring instead that ‘the intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the 
business of this Court.”). 
 129.  Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 130.  448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 131.  Id. at 332. 
 132.  Id. at 301. 
 133.  Id. at 318. 
 134.  Id. at 316. 
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choose whether to terminate a pregnancy, human dignity was 
outweighed when the government had to get involved by paying for 
that freedom. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting in McRae, referred to the Hyde 
Amendment as “the product of an effort to deny to the poor the 
constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade.”135  Justice Marshall 
linked the outcome to the Court’s “unwillingness to apply the 
constraints of the Constitution to decisions involving the expenditure 
of governmental funds.”136  While not using the term human dignity, 
Justice Marshall reflected on a welfare recipient’s dilemma to either 
have the child or obtain a “back-alley” abortion.137  Justice Blackmun, 
in his dissent, described as “condescension” the Court’s statement 
that a Medicare recipient needing a medically necessary abortion 
“may go elsewhere for her abortion.”138 
In the late 1980s, the Court continued to rule in favor of the 
government in a series of cases in which petitioners challenged the 
constitutionality of certain eligibility requirements in welfare 
statutes.139  In Luckhard v. Reed, the Court ruled that personal injury 
awards should be counted as income for purposes of determining 
welfare eligibility.140  In that case, the petitioner received a lump sum 
                                                          
 135.  McRae, 448 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 136.  Id. at 347. 
 137.  Id. at 346. 
 138.  Id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 139.  See Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 
U.S. 587 (1987) (The Court used a rational basis analysis to affirm constitutionality of 
the provision at issue, which authorized AFDC to require that a family's eligibility for 
benefits take into account, with certain exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, 
and sisters living in the same home, which would include child support payments for 
one of the children from a non-custodial parent.).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Brennan discusses the government’s infringement of a fundamental right: “the 
Government “‘directly and substantially’ interfere[s] with family living 
arrangements, and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right.  The infringement is 
direct, because a child whose mother needs AFDC cannot escape being required to 
choose between living with the mother and being supported by the father.  It is 
substantial because the consequence of that choice is damage to a relationship 
between parent and child.”  Id. at 624. 
 140.  Luckhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 381 (1987).  
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personal injury payment, which disqualified her from AFDC funds.141  
If the government had treated the payment as an asset, the petitioner 
would have lost benefits for only the month in which she received the 
award.142  The Court affirmed the state’s treatment of the award as 
income, thus disqualifying the permanently disabled mother from 
AFDC benefits.143  The Court also ruled against welfare benefits in 
Lyng v. UAW, upholding the state’s denial of food stamps to a striking 
employee who was losing income because of the strike.144  The Court 
agreed with the state that participation in the strike made petitioner 
ineligible for food stamps.145 
In 1995, the Court in Anderson v. Edwards, upheld a California 
provision of the AFDC that groups into a single “assistance unit” all 
needy children living in the same household, including non-siblings, 
if one adult cares for them.146  Petitioner, who was caring for her minor 
granddaughter and two grandnieces in the same household, sued 
because the California rule resulted in a $200.00 decrease in her AFDC 
benefit (she had a higher amount of benefits when caring for only her 
granddaughter).147  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the 
California provision violated federal law, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed.148 
As shown, human dignity has proven frail as a constitutional 
value in cases involving the government’s provision of economic 
assistance.  This is so despite the strong ties between liberty, which 
the Court has routinely ruled to protect, and food security.  Cass 
Sunstein highlights FDR’s vision of a second Bill of Rights, premised 
on the notion that “necessitous men are not free men,” saying: 
“[u]nlike the Constitution’s framers, ‘we have come to a clear 
realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist 
                                                          
 141.  Reed, 481 U.S. at 373. 
 142.  Id. at 371. 
 143.  Id. at 383. 
 144.  485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 145 (1995). 
 147.  Id. at 148. 
 148.  Id. at 149. 
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without economic security and independence.’”149  In light of the 
Court’s advancement of human dignity in Obergefell, reasons for the 
Court’s failure to acknowledge a right to food security have become 
increasingly fragile. 
 
III.   Five Reasons the United States Supreme Court  
  Should Establish a Fundamental Right to Food  
  Security 
 
The Court should affirm human dignity in welfare rights cases 
by acknowledging a fundamental right to food security under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.  
The Court’s existing jurisprudence regarding liberty and human 
dignity, and international and foreign legal standards relating to food 
security evidences this conclusion.  This section provides five 
arguments as to why the Court should acknowledge this right; each 
argument also provides a response to the counterargument as to why 
the Court has not and should not recognize such a right. 
 
A. The Positive/Negative Rights Distinction Lacks Merit in 
View of Supreme Court Human Dignity Jurisprudence. 
 
In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Justice Thomas 
emphasizes his position that human dignity serves as a constitutional 
value with regard to only negative rights: “Our Constitution—like the 
Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a simple 
truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to 
be shielded from—not provided by—the State.”150 
Justice Thomas linked the foundational principles of this country, 
as reflected in the Declaration of Independence’s “all men are created 
equal” proclamation, to its religious underpinnings that all men are 
created in the divine image “and therefore [are] of inherent worth.”151  
                                                          
 149.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.  
 150.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 151.  Id. 
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Justice Thomas then concluded that because of all citizens’ innate 
human dignity, the government cannot advance nor impede the 
value.152 
Commentators posit the Court relies on human dignity only to 
affirm negative rights, not positive ones that create obligations on the 
part of the State.153  One commentator describes this distinction as 
follows: “[n]egative rights comprise defensive claims against invasion 
by the state; the citizen can assert a negative right against the 
government, … positive rights extend a sword, entailing affirmative 
claims that can be used to compel the state to afford substantive goods 
or services” based on the Constitution.154 
Despite the distinction, which many commentators reject as 
groundless with regard to a fundamental right to food security,155 this 
argument lacks merit for several reasons.  First, the government’s 
commitment already exists.  Our nation has already obligated itself to 
provide assistance to families in need, through programs such as 
TANF, WIC,156 and food stamps.  Arguably, the Court’s present role 
is to ensure the government does not unfairly and without due 
process deprive citizens of access to these resources.157  Yet, for the 
                                                          
 152.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 153.  See Whitman, supra note 52, at 1161. 
 154.  See Hershkoff, supra note 85.  
 155.  Id. at 810 (questioning the validity of this distinction in view of 
constitutional challenges involving, for instance, denial of a parade permit; the 
commentator asks whether this challenge involves interference with a right or right 
to provision of police and other governmental services); Krasnov, supra note 11, at 
737. 
 156.  The United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service 
describes WIC as a nutrition program for women, infants, and children (“WIC”) that 
“provides Federal grants to States for supplemental foods, health care referrals, and 
nutrition education for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding 
postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five who are found to be 
at nutritional risk.”  Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://
www.fns.usda.gov/wic/women-infants-and-children-wic (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 157.  See Kendrex, supra note 110, at 138 (“Neither Congress nor the states can 
deny welfare benefits in a way that violates an individual’s freedom of association or 
freedom to travel, and welfare cannot be denied without a full and fair hearing.  
Likewise, welfare cannot be instituted or revoked in a way that violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
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past forty-five years, the Court has routinely ruled in favor of the 
government and against the poor. 
With regard to obligations toward the poor, the Court has, in the 
past, relied on human dignity to rule in favor of a fundamental right 
to assistance under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.  In Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan linked 
the petitioner’s constitutional claim to living with human dignity,158 
stating, “From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been 
to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its 
borders.”159  Justice Brennan went on to describe the impact of the 
state’s failure to provide public assistance. 
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can 
help bring within the reach of the poor the same 
opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community.  At the same 
time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may 
flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration 
and insecurity.  Public assistance, then, is not mere 
charity, but a means to “promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity.”160 
Goldberg,161 Shapiro,162 United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno,163 and Boddie v. Connecticut164 reflect the Court embracing 
                                                          
 158.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 162.  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 163.  413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973) (holding an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that 
excluded from eligibility any household containing someone unrelated to the others 
in the household, and thus discriminated against “hippies,” violated the Fifth 
Amendment).   
 164.  401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (holding that due process prohibits the State from 
denying opportunity to dissolve a marriage because of inability to pay courts costs 
from indigence). 
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economic rights regarding the poor.165  In Goldberg, Justice Brennan 
commenced a path in which the Court, looking through the due 
process lens, relied on a national “commitment” to assure the human 
dignity of all citizens by providing a minimum standard of life.166 
Additionally, in other circumstances, the Supreme Court has 
relied on human dignity to satisfy constitutional guarantees, even 
when doing so requires an affirmative obligation on the government’s 
part.  For instance, in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with regard 
to prison conditions, the Court has ruled that the government must 
take steps to ensure the fair treatment of incarcerated individuals.167  
As Justice Kennedy said in Brown v. Plata, a prison overcrowding case 
involving inmates’ claims of inadequate health care: “A prison that 
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical 
care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no 
place in civilized society.”168  Accordingly, once the government takes 
on the obligation to incarcerate, it must do so fairly based largely on 
human dignity concerns. 
Public schooling provides another example.  In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court sought to advance the human dignity of African-
American children by striking down the “separate but equal” 
doctrine.169  The Court never used the term human dignity; yet, the 
Court emphasized the demeaning impact on African-American 
children of having to attend a separate school from their white 
counterparts: “To separate them from others of a similar age and 
qualification solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
insecurity as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”170  This ruling 
                                                          
 165.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 159–62 (“By the late 1960s, the Court seemed to 
be moving toward recognition of a robust set of social and economic rights.”). 
 166.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 (“From its founding, the Nation's basic 
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its 
borders.”). 
 167.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011). 
 168.  Id. at 1928. 
 169.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896).  
 170.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
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created an affirmative obligation on the government’s part to ensure 
the children’s access to equal schools:  “Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments … such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”171  As Cass 
Sunstein notes, many of our “negative rights” cost the government 
money and require the government’s affirmative steps.172 
In the 1960s, under President Johnson, the Government 
commenced an “unconditional” War on Poverty, with state and the 
federal government undertaking programs to provide resources for 
the needy.173  Arguably, as with public education, Social Security, 
Medicare, and conditions on incarceration, the Court’s current role is 
to strike down government attempts to unfairly interfere with 
individuals’ access to the assistance (like denying benefits without a 
hearing).  However, the welfare cases of the past fifty years reflect the 
Court doing just the opposite: affirming the government’s attempts to 
lessen and chip away at access to government resources.174 
 
B. The Court’s Conception of Human Dignity, with its Strong 
Ties to Liberty is Consistent with a Right to Food Security. 
 
Liberty enjoys a paramount role in our constitutional 
jurisprudence based on the Founding Fathers’ distrust of government 
and need to ensure against tyranny and government intrusion.175  
Many argue that since liberty serves as this nation’s lodestar value, as 
                                                          
 171.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 172.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 200. 
 173.  The War on Poverty was part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 
Society.”  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of 
the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787.   
 174.  See infra Part III.  
 175.  Edward Eberle, in one of his many comprehensive articles comparing Germany 
and the U.S., summarizes the key difference between the two nations’ constitutional 
jurisprudence as “the vision of the Constitution they are pursuing, an American 
constitution of liberty as compared to a German constitution of dignity.”  Edward J. 
Eberle, Equality in Germany and the United States, 10 S.D. INT’L L.J. 63, 120 (2008). 
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opposed to human dignity, the preeminent value in other nations,176 
the Court’s reliance on human dignity is limited to those instances 
that involve freedom from government interference and affirm privacy 
and autonomy.  As Neomi Rao, who has written extensively on the 
contours and various meanings of human dignity, explains, “The 
positive, communitarian dignity at the heart of the welfare state is not 
the prevailing one in the United States.  In American political and legal 
discourse, dignity is primarily associated with individual rights, a 
classical liberal understanding of freedom from interference.”177 
Some argue that economic rights are inconsistent with civil rights 
and liberty.178  For instance, the Reagan administration179 sought to 
“recast the vocabulary of the human rights debate” to eliminate 
economic rights.180  The administration posited that human rights 
include “only ‘political rights and civil liberties.’”181  According to 
those who hold this view, “by recognizing economic rights, the 
government ‘waters down’ civil and political rights and undermines 
individual liberty.”182 
However, as with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act,183 Social Security, Medicare, and public schooling, human dignity 
                                                          
 176.  See Goodman, supra note 42 (comparing German and American notions of 
human dignity in constitutional jurisprudence); see Marc Chase McAllister, Human 
Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the United States as Examined Through Each 
Country’s Leading Abortion Case, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.J. 491, 491 (2004) (positing 
that securing civil liberties, not protecting human dignity, is the lodestar value of the 
American Constitution). 
 177.  Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform, 35 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 
171, 174 (2013), http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/35_1_
171_Rao.pdf. 
 178.  Krasnov, supra note 11, at 756 (citing Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 385 (1990)). 
 179.  Ronald Reagan was President from January 1981 to January 1989. 
 180.  WILLIAM F. FELICE, THE GLOBAL NEW DEAL: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN WORLD POLITICS 238 (2010). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Krasnov, supra note 11, at 745. 
 183.  Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which President Obama then 
signed into law on March 23, 2010.  On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld key 
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as liberty can certainly coexist with (and be enhanced by) the 
government’s provision of resources.  Many argue the government’s 
provision of health care/insurance enhances liberty, just as public 
education provides freedom and opportunity to those who partake of 
it.184  As FDR said, with regard to his “Second Bill of Rights,”185 and 
the inadequacy of the first Bill of Rights, “We have come to a clearer 
realization of the fact … that true individual freedom cannot exist 
without economic security and independence.”186  Arguably, the 14.7 
million children living in poverty in the United States lack the same 
freedom and opportunities to participate in democracy as their 
counterparts who are food secure or enjoy “freedom from want.”187 
Regarding the differences between European and American 
notions of human dignity, commentators describe European nations’ 
conception of human dignity as advancing the free unfolding of 
personality—the individual’s right to develop and flourish.188  In 
Germany and other nations, this right to flourish necessitates the 
government providing the basics of education, work, and food.189  In 
Germany, the Sozialstaat, or social state principle, along with the 
promise of human dignity obligate the state to act on behalf of its 
citizens to secure their welfare and freedom.190 
                                                          
provisions of the health care law.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11 (2010), http://housedocs.
house.gov/energycommerce/ppacacon.pdf. 
 184.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 217–18. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  FDR’s third freedom, from his famous “Four Freedoms” speech, was 
freedom from want: “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a 
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world.”  President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 6, 
1941), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fftext.pdf. 
 187.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 (1970) (Justice Brennan expressly tied welfare and 
providing for those in need to “securing the Blessings of Liberty.”). 
 188.  Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and 
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 966 (1997). 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  Human dignity arises from Article 1 of the Basic Law and the social state 
principle arises out of Article 20, which provides at section (1): “The Federal Republic 
of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.”  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, BASIC 
LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27 (2012), https://www.bundestag.de/
blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf. 
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The German Constitutional Court (“GCC”) has held that human 
dignity, with other constitutional guarantees, “imposes an obligation 
on the state to provide at least minimal subsistence to every 
individual.”191  The GCC has used the promise of human dignity “to 
give meaning to the ‘existential minimum’ of social welfare in the 
German Basic Law, by which society is obliged to provide everyone 
with the socioeconomic conditions adequate for a dignified 
existence.”192 
 Fundamentally, the Sozialstaat obligates the state to act on behalf 
of its citizens to secure their dignity, welfare, and freedom.  Certainly 
the obligation to enact social welfare measures is part of this.  But so 
is the idea that the state has a moral duty to act on behalf of its citizens 
over a wide range of measures such as education, protection of human 
life, human security, and achievement of social justice.  Further, the 
state is to respect and guarantee individual freedom and protect 
against violations of personal rights.  The proactive duties associated 
with the state reflect a vision of man as not just an isolated, sovereign 
individual, but a person bound to, and defined within, a community.  
The idea of Sozialstaat obligates the state to create and maintain 
necessary social conditions so that man can thrive.193 
Thus, the German idea of freedom suggests freedom with help 
from the government, rather than freedom from the government.194  As 
Erin Daly explains the GCC’s interpretation of human dignity and the 
social state principle: “dignity means that people must have some 
control over their lives, must not be forced by circumstance to devote 
their lives to finding food or protection from the elements.”195 
The GCC’s Hartz IV judgment illustrates the Sozialstaat principle.  
In Hartz IV, the GCC ruled the federal legislature had failed to 
properly determine social welfare benefits based on the legislature’s 
                                                          
 191.  McCrudden, supra note 64. 
 192.  Katherine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights, 33 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 113, 134 (2008). 
 193.  Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of Freedom, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 52–53 
(2008). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS 155 (2013). 
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lack of underlying statistical investigation.196  In reaching its decision, 
the GCC relied on the guarantee of human dignity, which provides 
an enforceable right to a subsistence level of benefits.  This right 
“guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform rights 
guarantee[,] which encompasses both the physical existence of the 
individual that is food, clothing, household goods . . . and a minimum 
of participation in social, cultural and political life.”197  Again, the state 
is not giving people dignity, but “merely enables every individual to 
lead a life that is consistent with human dignity, and uphold[s] the 
possibility of self-determination and autonomy.”198 
American constitutional jurisprudence reflects a strong liberty 
component tied to human dignity, where state interference is a 
catalyst for dignity concerns, as in cases involving the right to choose 
(autonomy), and right to privacy (right to be left alone).199  In Roe v. 
Wade200 and the other cases involving abortion, the Court emphasized 
the right to choose.  In 1992, in revisiting its abortion jurisprudence 
from Roe v. Wade, the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,201 described 
a woman’s right to choose: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, its meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.202 
                                                          
 196.  See Stefanie Egidy, Casenote, The Fundamental Right to the Guarantee of a 
Subsistence Minimum in the Hartz IV Decision of the German Constitutional Court, VOL 12, 
NO. 11 GERMAN L.J. 1961 (2011). 
 197.  Hartz IV 125 BVerfGE 175 (2010); DONALD P. KOMMERS AND RUSSELL A. 
MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 50 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 198.  Id. at 1970. 
 199.  KOMMERS AND MILLER, supra note 197, at 1970. 
 200.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 201.  505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming Roe’s basic holding, yet 
holding the legislature could constitutionally limit the right to abortion). 
 202.  Id. at 851 (plurality opinion). 
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In Casey, Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in 
the opinion, described a woman’s “authority” to choose whether to 
have an abortion as “an element of basic human dignity.”203  
Commentators note the “intertwining nature of dignity, liberty, and 
privacy”204 in these cases. 
 Our existing constitutional jurisprudence in criminal law,205 racial 
and gender discrimination,206 free speech,207 and right to marriage 
equality208 all reflect a conception of human dignity aligned with 
liberty as allowing the individual to flourish within society, not 
despite society.  For instance, in Cohen v. California, the Court 
overturned Paul Cohen’s arrest for wearing a jacket that said “f**k the 
draft.”209  Justice Harlan noted the purpose of preserving human 
dignity in striking down the government’s case.210  Citing the 
concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California,211 
Justice Harlan noted that freedom of expression “will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and . . . no 
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity 
                                                          
 203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 204.  Daly, supra note 179; see Rao, supra note 32, at 204 (“Individual liberty and 
freedom from interference emphasize the primacy of the individual, a being who 
chooses his own life.  When courts invoke dignity in the context of holding off the 
government, they are invoking the idea that dignity rests in individual agency, the 
ability to choose without state interference.”). 
 205.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984) (“The right to appear 
pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the 
presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible 
defense.”). 
 206.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (noting the 
“deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies equal access to public 
establishments” (quoting Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)). 
 207.  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984) (“The First 
Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect 
of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common 
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”). 
 208.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 209.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 210.  Id. at 24. 
 211.  74 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927). 
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and choice upon which our political system rests.”212 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, a gender discrimination case, 
Justice Brennan described the effect of discrimination on the 
individual’s ability to thrive in society: “It thereby both deprives 
persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of 
wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life.”213  In these 
cases, the Court protected an interest much like the European free 
unfolding of personality, an interest that involves an individual’s 
identity and ability to flourish in society.  Without food security and 
the accompanying dignity, an individual lacks the ability to 
participate in political, economic, and cultural life.  As one 
commentator notes: “Rhetorically speaking, how can people exercise 
their free choice if they have no food on the table, or if they are unable 
to treat their sicknesses?  Thus, positive dignity mandates state action 
to alleviate these conditions.”214 
And, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy described what liberty 
provides:  
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a 
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.  The petitioners in these cases seek to find that 
liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having 
their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and 
conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite 
sex.215  In addition[,] these liberties extend to certain 
“personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs.216 
 
 
                                                          
 212.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
 213.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. 
 214.  Glensy, supra note 26, at 66. 
 215.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2593. 
 216.  Id. at 2597. 
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C.   The Supreme Court Has Ruled to Affirm Fundamental 
  Rights Not Expressly Provided in the Constitution. 
 
The Supreme Court has often relied on values and rights not 
expressly found in the Constitution.  Human dignity itself is a value 
not mentioned in the Constitution; yet the Court has routinely relied 
upon it, though, as commentators often note, without providing its 
contours or definition.217  Accordingly, while the Justices quibble over 
its meaning,218 with some leaning on it much more heavily, and 
commentators continue to debate its relevance and definition, most 
agree the value plays a role in our constitutional jurisprudence.219 
Some argue human dignity is among the nation’s founding 
principles.  In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton mentions 
human dignity as a lodestar value, arguing for adoption of the 
Constitution as “the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and 
your happiness.”220  FDR called the Bill of Rights, “the great American 
charter of personal liberty and dignity.”221  As Judge Walter Mansfield 
wrote, in a case involving welfare benefits, the General Welfare 
                                                          
 217.  See Maxine Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); Rao, supra note 32, at 206 (2008); Henry, supra 
note 25, at 171; Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 183 (2011).  
 218.  See infra Part III.D. 
 219.  See Paust, supra note 25; Henkin, supra note 22.  In terms of the nation’s 
Founders, the Declaration of Independence of 1776 states as a “self-evident truth” 
that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”  
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  The Declaration goes on to 
state that government’s purpose is “to secure these rights.”  Accordingly, the Court 
has repeatedly tied human dignity to Liberty. 
 220.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); Glensy, supra note 26, at 77; 
Parent, supra note 50, at 69 (noting that Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, 
stated: “Yes, my countrymen, I own to you, that, that after having given in my 
attentive consideration, I am clearly of the opinion, it is your interest to adopt it.  I am 
convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness.”). 
 221.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 131 Proclamation 2524, Bill of Rights Day 
(November 27, 1941), in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16046. 
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Clause of the Constitution’s Preamble requires economic security: 
Receipt of welfare benefits may not at the present time 
constitute the exercise of a constitutional right.  But 
among our Constitution’s expressed purposes was the 
desire to “insure domestic tranquility” and “promote 
general Welfare.”  Implicit in these phrases are certain 
basic concepts of humanity and decency.  One of these, 
voiced as a goal in recent years by most responsible 
governmental leaders, both state and federal, is the desire 
to insure that indigent, unemployable citizens will at least 
have the bare minimums required for existence without 
which our expressed constitutional rights and liberties 
frequently cannot be exercised and therefore become 
meaningless.222 
At the same time, the Court has acknowledged fundamental 
rights not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the most famous 
among them being privacy.  Although the Constitution does not 
mention privacy, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to 
privacy, based on human dignity, beginning in the 1960s with 
Griswold v. Connecticut, which involved the dispensing or use of birth 
control devices.223  In Griswold, the Court first recognized the right to 
personal privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court 
ruled unconstitutional a Connecticut statute prohibiting the 
dispensing or use of birth control devices to or by married couples.224  
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court relied on penumbras 
emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.225   
The opinion emphasized the sanctity of marriage, stating: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
                                                          
 222.  Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 346–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 223.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965). 
 224.  Id. at 485.  
 225.  Id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance.”). 
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Rights—older than political parties, older than our school 
system.  Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.226 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird in the 1970s, and coming to the forefront more 
recently in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the right to privacy “emanating” from the express guarantees, 
grounded in human dignity; it protects individuals against 
unwarranted government intrusion in their homes, bedrooms, and 
private affairs.227 
The Court affirmed the “right to marry” in Zablocki v. Redhail, 
striking down as an equal protection violation, a law that prevented 
fathers who were behind on their child support payments from 
marrying.228  The Court noted in Loving v. Virginia, primarily an equal 
protection decision, that “the freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”229  And recently in Ogerbefell, the 
Court applied, as its second principle, that “the right to marry is 
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other 
in its importance to the committed individuals.”230 
Not only has the Court ruled in favor of rights to privacy and to 
marriage but the Court has also struck down the constitutionality of 
statutes based on the “right to travel,” a right certainly not mentioned 
                                                          
 226.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(establishing the right of unmarried people to possess contraceptives); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 US 558, 575–78 (2003) (Justice Kennedy discusses the stigma “all that 
imports for the dignity of the persons charged.  The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private conduct a crime”).  Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 227.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Lawrence, 539 U.S.at 578. 
 228.  434 U.S. 374 (1978) (“Since our past decisions make clear that the right to 
marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here 
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that ‘critical 
examination’ of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is 
required.”). 
 229.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 230.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
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in the Constitution.  In both Shapiro v. Thompson231 and Saenz v. Roe,232 
the Court struck down durational residency requirements as part of 
welfare benefits.  Specifically, the Court addressed the 1992 part of the 
California statute regarding AFDC that limited maximum welfare 
benefits during a resident’s first year of residency in California to the 
amount the resident was receiving in his prior residence.233  For the 
California residents who sued, the statute resulted in substantially 
lower welfare benefits than they would have received, absent the 
statutory provision.234  The Court held the statute unconstitutional 
because it infringed on the resident’s “right to travel,” a right “firmly 
embedded in our jurisprudence.”235 
Similarly, in Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court advanced “a right to 
be heard” by striking down Connecticut’s procedures for 
commencing a divorce action; the procedures required welfare 
recipients to pay court fees and costs for service of process, which 
restricted their access to the courts when suing for divorce.236  Justice 
Harlan, writing for the Court, acknowledged “the right to be heard:”  
“No less than these rights, the right to a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against 
denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular 
individuals.”237  
Each of these rights, none of which is expressly guaranteed in the 
Constitution and some of them fundamental based on the Court’s 
analysis, arise out of the Court’s role in preserving individuals’ 
human dignity.  Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses or a “penumbra” arising from a specific 
                                                          
 231.  394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (concurrence) (citing United States v. Guest for the 
notion that ‘‘the constitutional right to travel from one State to another … has been 
firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”). 
 232.  526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 233.  At the time of the decision, California, according to Justice Stevens, was one 
of the most generous states in terms of welfare benefits under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children programs.  It had the sixth highest benefit levels.  Saenz, 
526 U.S. at 492. 
 234.  Id. at 506–07. 
 235.  Id. at 498. 
 236.  401 U.S. 371, 377–78 (1971). 
 237.  Id. at 379. 
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guarantee, when aligned with human dignity concerns, should 
provide for a constitutional right to food security in the United States. 
 
D.  The Supreme Court Should Rule in Favor of a Fundamental 
Right to Food Security Because Poverty Shames, Demeans, 
and Humiliates, and the Court Has, in the Past, Ruled to 
Remedy Shame and Humiliation. 
 
As Tevya, the milkman from Anatevka says to God at the 
beginning of “If I Were a Rich Man,”238 in Fiddler on the Roof: “Dear 
God, you made many, many poor people.  I realize, of course, that it’s 
no shame to be poor.  But it’s no great honor either!”239  Commentators 
routinely link poverty to shame, in addition to poverty’s link to poor 
health and lack of education.240  Regarding the humiliating impact of 
being poor, one commentator discussing poverty in England writes, 
“poverty is inextricably linked to shame across societies; it suggests 
that to ignore stigma is potentially to miss out on some of the most 
corrosive effects of poverty.”241 
In discussing the earned income tax credit, a commentator 
recently praised it for providing a benefit to the poor without stigma: 
“While decades of research has shown that other anti-poverty 
programs tend to confer stigma, isolating the poor from mainstream 
society, this tax credit generates strong feelings of inclusion and hope 
for upward mobility.”242 
The Court has routinely ruled in favor of petitioners seeking 
redress for constitutional infractions stemming from government 
                                                          
 238.  From Fiddler on the Roof, a musical by Jerry Bock and Sheldon Harnick. 
 239.  If I Were a Rich Man lyrics, LYRICSMANIA.COM, http://www.lyricsmania.com/
if_i_were_a_rich_man_lyrics_fiddler_on_the_roof.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 240.  Caroline Gregorie, Study Reveals Sad Link Between Poverty and Children’s 
Brain Development, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2015/03/30/brain-development-poverty_n_6968758.html. 
 241.  Declan Gaffney, The Missing Dimension of Poverty: Stigma, New Statesman, 
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2013/02/missing-dimen
sion-poverty-stigma. 
 242.  Laura Tach & Kathryn Edin, When Taxes Aren’t a Drag, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2105), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/opinion/when-taxes-arent-a-drag.html?_r=0. 
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treatment that demeans or humiliates.  Search and seizure and 
prisoner treatment cases illustrate when the Court finds it necessary 
to step in to strike down whatever government action results in 
humiliation.243  For instance, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Court struck down 
as unconstitutional an Alabama prison’s practice of handcuffing 
misbehaving prisoners to a hitching post.244  In describing the 
humiliating nature of the hitching post punishment (in the sun, 
without adequate water or bathroom breaks), the Court emphasized 
that what underlies the Eighth Amendment “is nothing less than the 
dignity of man.”245 
Regarding Fourth Amendment due process protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court’s language suggests an 
unwavering commitment to human dignity, in terms of avoiding 
shame and humiliation (however, the results at times belie this 
unwavering commitment).246  In Rochin v. California,247 after his arrest 
for allegedly possessing morphine in violation of California law, Mr. 
Rochin was forcibly taken to a hospital.  Once there, under a police 
officer’s direction, “a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube 
                                                          
 243.  See Goodman, supra note 217, at 767–76. 
 244.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 730 (2002). 
 245.  Id. at 738. 
 246.  See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 482 U.S. 602 (1989) in which 
the Court affirmed the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of mandatory 
blood and urine tests for railroad employees under regulations promulgated by the 
Federal Railroad Administration.  The Court held no warrants or reasonable 
suspicion were required before the testing because, in the balance, the government 
had a strong interest in obtaining the test results to ensure public safety.  The 
employees had a diminished expectation to privacy because the test’s intrusiveness 
was minimal.  Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, emphasizing the indignity and humiliation suffered by employees 
at having the sample taken.  Urination is “among the most private of activities,” 
according to the dissenting Justices, especially with a monitor listening at the door.  
Id. at 645.  Justice Marshall likened the assault on personal dignity in Skinner to the 
World War II relocation-camp and McCarthy-era cases in terms of the denials of 
liberty in times of perceived necessity.  Id. at 635.  He wrote of the danger of sacrificing 
fundamental freedoms in the name of exigency: “History teaches that grave threats 
to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too 
extravagant to endure.”  Id. 
 247.  342 U.S. 165 (1952) (the “shocks the conscience” decision). 
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into Rochin’s stomach against his will.  This ‘stomach pumping’ 
produced vomiting.  In the vomited matter were found two capsules 
which proved to contain morphine.”248 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held that police 
violated Mr. Rochin’s due process rights, describing the force used 
against him as brutal and “offensive to human dignity.”249  In 1984, 
the Court again struck down as unconstitutional a bodily intrusion 
where police sought to compel a criminally accused individual to 
undergo surgery to remove a bullet that might implicate the accused 
in criminal proceedings.250  In applying the Fourth Amendment 
protection, the Court described the “extent of intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity.”251 
In Lawrence v. Texas,252 the Supreme Court relied on human 
dignity when describing how the Texas anti-sodomy law at issue 
demeaned those subject to its prohibition.253  The Court overturned 
Bowers v. Hardwick,254 holding that a Texas law prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in part because it was demeaning.255  The 
Court further explained, “The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private conduct a crime.”256  
Justice Kennedy described the privacy interest at stake as follows: “It 
                                                          
 248.  Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
 249.  Id. at 174.  But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the 
Court reached the opposite result, holding the intrusion constitutional, for mandatory 
testing of a criminally accused’s blood for alcohol content.  The Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Brennan, described the Fourth Amendment as protecting “personal privacy 
and dignity against unwanted intrusion by the State.”  Id. at 767.  The blood tested 
passed constitutional muster only because the test chosen to measure blood-alcohol 
was reasonable under the circumstances and was performed in a reasonable manner. 
 250.  Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1984). 
 251.  Id. at 761. 
 252.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 253.  Id. at 575–78 (Justice Kennedy discusses the stigma “all that imports for the 
dignity of the persons charged.  The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private conduct a crime.”). 
 254.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 255.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 256.  Id. at 578. 
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suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon 
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private 
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”257  Accordingly, the 
Court has repeatedly treated human dignity as the antidote to laws 
and government acts that demean and humiliate.   
The Windsor Court noted that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments “withdraw . . . from Government the power to degrade 
or demean . . . .”258  In Obergefell, the Court discussed the “stigma” 
ascribed to the children of same sex couples who are unable to marry. 
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability 
marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser.  They also 
suffer the significant material costs of being raised by 
unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their 
own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.  The 
marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the 
children of same-sex couples.259 
This language resembles the language found in Brown v. Board of 
Education,260 written sixty years ago, in which the Court described the 
impact of separate but equal on children as follows: “To separate them 
from others of a similar age and qualification solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of insecurity as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”261  In both cases, the Court leans heavily on human 
dignity as the value underlying the constitutional guarantees at stake 
and the need to redress “institutionalized humiliation.”262 
Likewise, the Court should acknowledge a fundamental right to 
                                                          
 257.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 258.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.  
 259.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2593 (Much of the opinion is written in terms of 
protecting children). 
 260.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 261.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 262.  See Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar., 
29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-a-constitu
tional-principle.html?_r=0. 
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food security because, among other ills involving health and 
education, poverty shames.  Dissenting in Wyman v. James,263 Justice 
Marshall noted the “severe intrusion upon privacy and family 
dignity” arising from welfare visits to a family’s home.264  This anti-
shame conception of human dignity is certainly controversial.  Justice 
Scalia challenges this “anti-shame” conception of human dignity in 
Indiana v. Edwards,265 a case involving whether a state that insists a 
defendant, whom the court deems competent to stand trial, not 
represent himself (for competency concerns) violates that defendant’s 
right to self-representation.266  The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Breyer, explained that the right of self-representation will not 
preserve a defendant’s human dignity (as it is meant to do) if the 
defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without 
the assistance of counsel.267 
The dissenting justices questioned the Court’s conception of 
human dignity as remedying conduct that demeans and shames.268  
Rather, according to Justice Scalia, human dignity means “being 
master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of 
individual choice.”269  He goes on to say “if the Court is to honor the 
particular conception of ‘dignity’ that underlies the self-
representation right, it should respect the autonomy of the individual 
by honoring his choices knowingly and voluntarily made.”270  Thus, 
the State should never step in to interfere with individual choice even 
if that choice leads to humiliation on the part of the petitioner.271  
Scalia suggested the government actually impedes an individual’s 
                                                          
 263.  400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
 264.  Id. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 265.  554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 266.  In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), the Court affirmed the 
constitutional right of self-representation with Justice O’Connor saying, “The right to 
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow 
the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible 
defense.”  Id. at 176-177. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  James, 400 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 269.  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 187. 
 270.  Id.  
 271.  Id. 
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dignity by insisting on the use of counsel.272 
In Obergefell, Justice Thomas provided a different definition of 
human dignity.  Justice Thomas wrote that because dignity is innate, 
the government can never advance it or deprive an individual of it.273  
In his dissenting opinion, which many commentators criticize for its 
reference to the dignity of slaves,274 Justice Thomas described the 
“corollary” of human dignity as follows: 
Human dignity cannot be taken away by the government.  
Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost 
their humanity) because the government allowed them to 
be enslaved.  Those held in internment camps did not lose 
their dignity because the government confined them.  
And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not 
lose their dignity because the government denies them 
those benefits.  The government cannot bestow dignity, 
and it cannot take it away.275 
Thus, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas defined the notion as 
something immutable, inherent in each person regardless of state 
action or inaction.  Justices Scalia and Thomas have conceded that 
human dignity serves as a value; the differences come in what the 
value means and requires.  According to Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
human dignity will never serve as a reason for the Court to rule on a 
constitutional issue because it is immutable—everyone has it, all the 
time, so the State cannot infringe on it or fail to afford it.  Yet, as shown 
here, the Court, international and foreign law, the federal 
government, and state governments have all (at times) taken the 
                                                          
 272.  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 187. 
 273.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 274.  Scott Eric Kaufman, Thomas’ Offensive Comparison: Same-Sex Marriage 
Opponents are Like Slaves—Defeated but Still Possessing Dignity, SALON.COM (Mar. 26, 
2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/26/thomas_offensive_comparison_same_sex_
marriage_opponents_are_like_slaves_defeated_but_still_possessing_dignity/.  See 
Jamil Smith, Clarence Thomas’s Disgraceful Definition of Human Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122178/clarence-thomas-
marriage-equality-dissent-all-about-him. 
 275.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639. 
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opposite approach, applying the need to protect, preserve, restore, 
and at times advance human dignity to remedy individualized, 
institutional humiliation and shame. 
 
E. The Court has Often Relied on International Legal 
Standards and Foreign Law,276 Both of Which Require Food 
Security. 
 
With regard to food security in the international arena, the 
United States “increasingly finds itself an outlier to an emerging 
global consensus.”277  It has “ratified fewer major human rights 
treaties than any other economically developed democracy….”278 
Under international law, all citizens have a right to food security 
based largely on the promise of human dignity.  Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as follows: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care[,] and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control.279 
And, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) provides at Article 11: 
                                                          
 276.  See Rex.  D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional 
Adjudication, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 197 (2011) (identifying the differences between 
international legal standards and foreign law). 
 277.  See Bruce Porter, Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to 
Refine the Scope of Charter Rights, 15 J. LAW & SOCIAL POL’Y 117, 122 (2000) (“On the 
other hand, our [Canada’s] approach to human rights protections has not 
incorporated this fundamental difference and has tended to conform more to a U.S. 
style rights regime in which social and economic rights have been accorded little 
recognition.”). 
 278.  Aaron X. Fellmeth, Leading from (a Bit) Behind: the United States and 
International, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 977, 988 (2014). 
 279.  UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; Glendon, supra note 47, at xv-xvi.  
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1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.  The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to 
this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing 
the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, 
shall take, individually and through international co-
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, 
which are needed….”280 
The United States has signed but not ratified the Covenant, thus it 
is not bound to adhere to it.281  There are 164 parties to the ICESCR, but 
only 6 signatories.282  One commentator notes the United States’ refusal 
to ratify the Convention, and its refusal, along with only one other 
country, to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.283  The 
United States has maintained this position of failing to affirm these 
covenants despite these treaties being based on the fundamental notion 
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”284 
Other nations’ constitutions provide for a fundamental right of 
food security, tied to human dignity.  The South African Bill of 
Rights285 provides that everyone has a right to sufficient food and water, 
                                                          
 280.  United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status 
of Ratification, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
 281.  Id. at 754 (“The President’s signature indicates at least a political willingness 
to be bound by the Covenant . . . thus, should the U.S. government decide to start 
systematically depriving its citizens of basic economic rights, it would be in breach of 
the ICESCR.”). 
 282.  United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status 
of Ratification, http://indicators.ohchr.org/; Krasnov, supra note 11, at n. 6. 
 283.  Porter, supra note 277, at 123. 
 284.  UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 279. 
 285.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 217 (describing the South African 
Constitution as “the world’s leading example of a transformative constitution” 
because so much of it was aimed at eliminating the system and effects of apartheid).  
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and the State must take “reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
that right.”286  The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution 
“enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”287 
The landmark case involving socioeconomic rights, particularly 
the right to housing, Government of the Republic of South Africa v. 
Grootboom288 acknowledged the interrelatedness of the socioeconomic 
rights with the civil and political rights in its reading of the 
Constitution.  The Constitutional Court proclimed, “[T]here can be no 
doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational 
values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or 
shelter.289  Affording socioeconomic rights to all people therefore 
enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2.”290  
Grootboom focused on the right to adequate housing; however, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the socioeconomic rights 
included in the Constitution cannot only exist on paper but must 
actually be implemented.291  The Court held the basic necessities of life 
are provided to all to affirm the promise of a society based on human 
dignity.292  According to the Court, the state must take affirmative 
steps to remedy the plight of those living in poverty, the homeless, or 
those residing in inhabitable dwellings.293 
Similarly, the German Basic Law contains both objective and 
subjective rights; the objective rights obligate the government to fulfill 
the objective values outlined in the Basic Law.294  Objective rights are 
described as forming “part of the legal order, the order public, [and] 
                                                          
 286.  Bill of Rights, S. AFRICAN CONST., Ch. 2, Section 27(1)(b), (2), http://www
.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp02.html. 
 287.  Id. at Section 7(1). 
 288.  Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2000 1 (CC), http://www.
saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html.  
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Grootboom, supra note 288, at para. 23.  
 291.  Id. at para. 20. 
 292.  Id. at 34. 
 293.  Id. at 20 (para. 24). 
 294.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 190. 
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thereby taking their place among the governing principles of German 
society.”295  Accordingly, the state has affirmative obligations to 
secure certain rights, including the rights to basic necessities to live, 
as described in the Hartz IV decision.296 
The Supreme Court has certainly relied on both international law 
standards as well as the standards of individual nations as persuasive 
authority for its decisions.  The Miranda decision relies on English and 
Scottish law for the warnings police must provide those whom they 
plan to interrogate and the results of those procedures.297  In Miranda, 
Justice Warren explained: 
The experience in some other countries also suggests that 
the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation 
is overplayed.  The English procedure, since 1912 under 
the Judges’ Rules, is significant.  As recently strengthened, 
the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an 
accused by a police officer as soon as he has evidence that 
affords reasonable grounds for suspicion….298 
 In Roper v. Simmons,299 a 2005 decision striking down capital 
punishment for juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy wrote: “The 
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, 
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”300  Justice Kennedy cited the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.301  Likewise, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,302 he cited three decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, noting that homosexual conduct was accepted as “an 
integral part of human freedom.”303 
                                                          
 295.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 190, at 969. 
 296.  See supra Part III.B. 
 297.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–88 (1966). 
 298.  Id. at 486. 
 299.  125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 300.  Id. at 578. 
 301.  Id. at 576. 
 302.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 303.  Id. at 577. 
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The Court’s practice of relying on this persuasive authority to 
bolster its analysis is certainly controversial, with certain justices 
showing more of a willingness to do so.304  Justice O’Connor 
encouraged courts’ continued reliance on foreign and international 
law as a way “to innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions 
to the new legal problems that arise each day; they offer much from 
which we can learn and benefit.”305  The Court has certainly shown its 
willingness to benefit from these authorities in its prior constitutional 
analysis, and therefore, it should once again look to other nations and 
international law standards to acknowledge food security as a 




Lawyers and academics should restore efforts to persuade the 
Court that just as the Constitution protects human dignity by allowing 
Americans to marry, to travel, to make private decisions about 
personal issues like contraception, and, if incarcerated, to receive 
adequate health care, so too should all Americans enjoy a right to food 
security.  Today, approximately 17.5 million households in the United 
States live without this very basic necessity, and many of those living 
without food are children.  Certainly, the promises of general welfare, 
ordered liberty, and living with dignity, all of which the Court has 
relied on, are diminished for those who lack sufficient food and 
nutrition.  This Article seeks to reignite the necessary discussion about 
the challenges of a Supreme Court jurisprudence in which human 
dignity requires a right of all to marry but, up until this point, does 
not acknowledge a fundamental right to food security for all. 
                                                          
 304.  See Diane Marie Amann, Cynthia R.L. Fairweather & Vivian Rhoe, Using 
International Law to Defend the Accused, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2000).  See David T. 
Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: 
Congress and the Executive Versus the Court, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 113 (2007). 
 305.  SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW, REFLECTIONS OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (2003) 234–35 (discussing reasons American judges should 
increase their reliance on foreign and international law). 
